This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian military mobilization efforts. Significant inflections ISW would normally cover in its regular sections will be summarized briefly today and addressed in more detail tomorrow.
The Russian military tried to move to an all-volunteer basis amid the 2008 financial crisis and failed to make the transition fully. The end of the Cold War and the demonstration in the 1991 Gulf War of the virtues of an all-volunteer military led many states to transition away from conscription models. The Russian military remained committed to the cadre-and-reserve model until 2008, when Putin directed his newly appointed Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov to move the Russian military to a professional model and reform it to save costs following the 2008 financial crisis.[1] One such cost-cutting measure reduced the term of mandatory conscript service to 18 months in 2007 and then to one year in 2008.
Soviet Military Maps Pro 25
The Russian military ended up with a hybrid model blending conscript and professional soldiers. Professional militaries are expensive because the state must offer prospective voluntary recruits far higher salaries and benefits than it gives to conscripts, who have no choice but to serve. Serdyukov quickly found that the Russian defense budget could not afford to offer enticements sufficient to overcome the centuries-old Russian resistance to military service. The Russian military thus became a mix of volunteer professional soldiers, whom the Russians call kontraktniki, and one-year conscripts.
The best available source of information is The Red Atlas, by John Davies and Dr Alexander J. Kent, published by the University of Chicago Press in 2017. (click image left for details) Those interested in the maps' historical and geopolitical context are urged to read the book, which also provides extensive descriptions of how and why the maps were made, with copious illustrations. This website supports the book by providing useful details, examples and listings.
In 2020, Russia spent $61.7bn on its military which accounted for 11.4 percent of government spending. In comparison, Ukraine spent $5.9bn on its military or 8.8 percent of government spending according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
A number of countries have sent military equipment to Ukraine, including Javelin anti-tank missiles from Estonia and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from Latvia and Lithuania. Kyiv is also using Turkish-made Bayrakhtar drones for reconnaissance
The claim that the U.S. is operating secret biolabs in Ukraine is one that has been repeatedly spread by Russian propagandists since at least 2018. In May 2020, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) released a statement calling on politicians to stop spreading false information about the existence of foreign military biological labs in Ukraine:
Before we get into the factual details that disprove this theory (such as the fact that the U.S. did not install and does not operate biolabs in Ukraine, completely nullifying the second half of this comparison), let's note a few quick observations about these two maps.
There is no evidence to indicate that these labs were "installed" by the U.S. military, nor that they are operated by U.S. forces. Here's a video about what these labs actually do and the ongoing disinformation campaign that targets them.
In addition to civil unrest across the country, the PDPA was experiencing deep internal turmoil due to factional rivalries between the Khalqists and the Parchamites; in September 1979, PDPA General-Secretary Nur Muhammad Taraki was assassinated on orders from the PDPA's second-in-command, Hafizullah Amin. Amin's supersession of Taraki put the Khalqists at an advantage against the Parchamites, while greatly souring Afghanistan's relationship with the Soviet Union. With fears rising that Amin was planning to ally Afghanistan with the United States,[69] Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev led his government to deploy the 40th Army inside Afghanistan on 24 December 1979.[70] Arriving in the capital city of Kabul, the Soviet military contingent stormed the Tajbeg Palace and assassinated Amin,[71] subsequently installing Parchamite-affiliated Babrak Karmal as Afghanistan's new pro-Soviet leader.[68] The decision by the Soviet Union to directly intervene in Afghanistan was based on the Brezhnev Doctrine.
The Soviet government had initially planned to swiftly secure Afghanistan's towns and road networks, stabilize the PDPA government under loyalist Karmal, and withdraw all of their military forces in a span of six months to one year. However, they were met with fierce resistance from Afghan guerrillas[80] and experienced great operational difficulties on the rugged mountainous terrain.[81][82] By the mid-1980s, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan had increased to approximately 115,000 troops, and fighting across the country intensified; the complication of the war effort gradually inflicted a high cost on the Soviet Union as military, economic, and political resources became increasingly exhausted.
By mid-1987, reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet military would begin a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, following a series of meetings with the Afghan government that outlined a policy of "National Reconciliation" for the country.[10][11] The final wave of disengagement was initiated on 15 May 1988, and on 15 February 1989, the last Soviet military column occupying Afghanistan crossed into the Uzbek SSR. With continued external Soviet backing, the PDPA government pursued a solo war effort against the mujahideen, and the conflict evolved into the Afghan Civil War. However, the deeply unpopular Afghan government lost all support as the Soviet Union itself collapsed in 1991, leading to the toppling of the PDPA's Democratic Republic at the hands of the mujahideen in 1992.
The Soviet Union (USSR) had been a major power broker and influential mentor in Afghan politics, its involvement ranging from civil-military infrastructure to Afghan society.[94] Since 1947, Afghanistan had been under the influence of the Soviet government and received large amounts of aid, economic assistance, military equipment training and military hardware from the Soviet Union. Economic assistance and aid had been provided to Afghanistan as early as 1919, shortly after the Russian Revolution and when the regime was facing the Russian Civil War. Provisions were given in the form of small arms, ammunition, a few aircraft, and (according to debated Soviet sources) a million gold rubles to support the resistance during the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. In 1942, the USSR again moved to strengthen the Afghan Armed Forces by providing small arms and aircraft, and establishing training centers in Tashkent (Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic). Soviet-Afghan military cooperation began on a regular basis in 1956, and further agreements were made in the 1970s, which saw the USSR send advisers and specialists. The Soviets also had interests in the energy resources of Afghanistan, including exploring oil and natural gas from the 1950s and 1960s.[95] The USSR began to import Afghan gas from 1968 onward.[96]
The 1975 rebellion, though unsuccessful, shook President Daoud Khan and made him realize that a friendly Pakistan was in his best interests.[111][108] He started improving relations with Pakistan and made state visits there in 1976 and 1978. During the 1978 visit, he agreed to stop supporting anti-Pakistan militants and to expel any remaining militants in Afghanistan. In 1975, Daoud Khan established his own party, the National Revolutionary Party of Afghanistan, and outlawed all other parties. He then started removing members of its Parcham wing from government positions, including the ones who had supported his coup, and started replacing them with familiar faces from Kabul's traditional government elites. Daoud also started reducing his dependence on the Soviet Union. As a consequence of Daoud's actions, Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated.[102] In 1978, after witnessing India's nuclear test, Smiling Buddha, Daoud Khan initiated a military buildup to counter Pakistan's armed forces and Iranian military influence in Afghan politics.
During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied a Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, many of which were viewed by conservatives as opposing Islam.[126] Decrees setting forth changes in marriage customs and land reform were not received well by a population deeply immersed in tradition and Islam, particularly by the powerful landowners harmed economically by the abolition of usury (although usury is prohibited in Islam) and the cancellation of farmers' debts. The new government also enhanced women's rights, sought a rapid eradication of illiteracy and promoted Afghanistan's ethnic minorities, although these programs appear to have had an effect only in the urban areas.[127] By mid-1978, a rebellion started, with rebels attacking the local military garrison in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and soon civil war spread throughout the country. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin seized power, arresting and killing Taraki. More than two months of instability overwhelmed Amin's regime as he moved against his opponents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion.
Even before the revolutionaries came to power, Afghanistan was "a militarily and politically neutral nation, effectively dependent on the Soviet Union."[114] A treaty, signed in December 1978, allowed the Democratic Republic to call upon the Soviet Union for military support.[128]
In 1979, Taraki attended a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, Cuba. On his way back, he stopped in Moscow on 20 March and met with Brezhnev, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and other Soviet officials. It was rumoured that Karmal was present at the meeting in an attempt to reconcile Taraki's Khalq faction and the Parcham against Amin and his followers. At the meeting, Taraki was successful in negotiating some Soviet support, including the redeployment of two Soviet armed divisions at the Soviet-Afghan border, the sending of 500 military and civilian advisers and specialists and the immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at 25 percent below the original price; however, the Soviets were not pleased about the developments in Afghanistan and Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for party unity. Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, the Soviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further in Afghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military intervention within Afghan borders during Taraki's rule as well as later during Amin's short rule.[132] 2ff7e9595c
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